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11. Introduction
Legal and administrative determinations of employers' compliance with
"equal employment opportunity" (EEO) requirements often hinge on the issue
of the availability of protected class members to employers. That is, courts
and affirmative action review agencies compare the hire rates of )rotected
class members (the ratio of the number of protected class members hired to
the number who applied or who were potentially available) to the comparable
ratio for other applicants, in assessing whether an employer's hiring policies
meet the standards required of them by equal opportunity regulations. The
purpose of this paper is to review what economic theory suggests nifects
availability and to analyze the extent to which these factors nrc con-
sidered in administrative or judicial decisions concerning hiring policies.
In our analyses, we will point out areas where there seem to he inconsistencies
or unresolved issues.
II. An Economic Model of Availability
As a rough approximation, once individuals have decided to seek work
for pay, the characteristics of the ultimate employee—job "match" will be
influenced by both employee behavior and employer policies. Below, we
discuss these influences as they pertain to the issue of availability.
A. Human Capital Decisions
Searching and/or training for a job often entail an investment by the
employee associated with schooling, with on—the—job training that initially
is paid for by lower wages, with a geographical move, or with the costs of
quitting one job and looking for another. These Investment costs represent
barriers to occupational and geographical mobility, but not insurmountable
ones in most cases. Workers will change occupations, domiciles and employers
2if the expected long—term gains are large enough to outweigh the initial
transactions costs.
Human capital theory has two major implications for the calculation of
"availability." First, not all of the protected class workers who consider
themselves in a given occupation are equally available to an employer
seeking employees to fill that job. The pecuniary and pSyChic costs of
making geographic changes appear to rise with distance, so that in
"national" or "regional" labor markets not all potential applicants are
equally likely to be interested. Persons with working spouses also face
higher costs of mobility, other things equal. Likewise, those currently
without employment tend to have lower opportunity costs of accepting a
given offer than those with a job, and even among the latter group transactions
costs will vary with the wage and compensation characteristics of the current
job. Finally, the long—term gains from a human capital investment fall
with age, so that older workers tend to be less mobile ("available") than
younger workers. Because the age distribution of the labor force varies by
race and sex, the proportions of the labor force actually "available" in a
labor markeL probably differ by race and sex.
Second, those not currently "in" the labor market from which a firm
is hiring may be induced to join if the net returns are high enough.
Employers normally hiring only those workers in the local area can induce
workers to move in from other areas if their compensation offers are
sufficiently high. Similarly, workers will change occupations when the
long—run net benefits are large enough. Thus, the concept of a particular
occupational/geographic "labor market" containing a fixed number of workers
is a simplification that ignores mobility among workers.
3B. Employer Policies
Participation and human capital decisions are usually modelled in
terms of general, market incentives —— incentives that are normally beyond
the control of one employer. However, an individual employer'E policies
clearly do affect the number and quality of its applicants, and It is to
a brief review of the effects of these policies to which w' now turn.
1) Size of Recruiting Area. Firms offering relativeLy generous compensa-
tion packages will attract larger numbers of applicants. The gellorous compensa—
Lion will offset high commuting costs for many workers who live far away from
the plant and tend to enlarge the geographic size of the firm's recruiting
area.
Psychic and pecuniary costs of commuting, however, vary with sex, income
level, and distance. Therefore, the geographic radius from which a given
plant can draw applicants may differ by race and sex, and the interest of
workers in the recruiting area will decline with distance from the plant.
The willingness of a firm to pay higher wages depends on Its ability to
enlarge the number of Its applicants and the payoff from doing so. Thus,
unskilled jobs where worker selection need not be very careful may have smaller
recruiting areas than more skilled jobs in the same plant where stringent
screening is required.
2) Applicant Quality. Compensation policies of a firm can also affect
the quality of its applicants. At lower compensation levels, only those
whose current wages are very low will tend to be "available" to a firm. At
higher levels, those available will include workers currently receiving
higher wages. Because high wages can be presumed to reflect high productivity,
higher wage offers by a firm will tend to attract more applicants of higher
4average productivity. The quality—increasing effects of higher wages, however,
could be offset by dilution associated with the increased probabilities of
attracting more distant applicants. Thus, while the number of high—productivity
applicants will rise as wages increase (causing the average qua] i ty of
successful applicants to rise), It is not possible to assert a priori whether
high—quality applicants will form a larger proportfon of total applicants.
Another factor affecting the quality of those hired is the recruiting
strategy of the firm. Some firms will, as above, offer high wages and
select the best from a large number of applicants. Others will offer low
starting wages and train previously unqualified new hires for their jobs.
Training offered may be general In nature, in which case it is paid for by
the employee in the form of low initial wage rates. If traintiig Is employer—
specific, both employer and employee will tend to share in us costs and
agree to a post—training compensation policy that discourages the other from
unilaterally severing the employment relationship. Thus "high—training"
strategies can substitute for "high wage" policies, with predictable effects
on hiring standards, the quality of applicants, wage rates and later mobility.
3) Sex and Race Composition of Applicants. Other aspects of a plant's
employment package can affect the sex and race composition of applicants.
A reputation for discrimination is one , but beyond that are
such things as career ladders, fringe benefit packages, and plant location.
Some plants maintain an "internal labor market," where new entrants are
initially placed in low—responsibility, low—paying jobs but offered a
succession of internal promotions later on. Employers look for qualities
beyond the entry—level job, and the employees who find these jobs attractive
are those who have a relatively long planning horizon and/or low discount rates.
There are likely to be cultural and/or wealth differences by race or sex that
5affect planning horizons and/or discount rates——and these factors will in turn
influence the proportion of protected class workers who both apply for such
jobs and are ultimately hired.
Fringe benefits form an increasing proportion of most compensation
packages, and they can subtly affect the race/sex mix of applicants. The
fundamental characteristic of fringe benefits is that they are not paid in
currently spendable cash; they are in—kind or deferred payments whose primary
advantage to an employee is their income tax treatment. Because tax breaks
are more valuable for high—income people, fringe benefits are of least
value to the poor. Low wage and low—wealth workers will tend to prefer cash;
thus, compensation packages that offer high fringe benefits and lower wages
will attract fewer minority applicants. Married women, who are perhaps
already covered by medical insurance (say), may also be less attracted by
compensation packages heavily weighted toward particular fringe benefits.
Finally, the locational decisions of a firm will affect the race and
sex composition of its applicants. Locating near pleasant suburban resi-
dential areas will tend to attract more women than locating near rioriresi—
dential areas. Similarly, locating near minority "ghettoes" wil.i attract
more minorities than locating near distant suburbs. Land values, access to
transportation and access to customers, as well as the availability of labor,
all affect locational decisions.
III. Operationalizing the Conceptual Framework
Given the above framework, it is interesting to ask how the criteria
and evidence used in discrimination in hiring cases relate to it. To do so,
we trace how the courts have treated a number of issues including the
geographic dimensions of a firm's labor market, the pool of potential
applicants, and the determination of which applicants or potential applicants
6are qualified for particular jobs. The discussion that follows is non-
technical in nature; citations to specific legal cases to support our
impressions are found in the footnotes (available from us on request). To
anticipate, we find that while the courts have moved increasingly towards
using criteria and evidence that are consistent with economic and statistical
analyses, in some cases they have not moved quite far enough.
A. The Geographic Dimension of a Firm's Labor Market
Early cases arbitrarily specified the extent of a firm's labor market
by geographic boundaries, such as a state, SMSA, or county.' However, such
a broad specification ignores a firm's location within an area; since an
Individual's willingness to work for a firm depends upon commuting time and
costs, where a firm is located will affect its potential labor supply.
Moreover, the higher the compensation a firm offers, the greater the distance
potential applicants will be willing to commute. Hence, the relevant
geographic labor market is a firm—specific concept and depends both on the
firm's location and its compensation policy.
Subsequent cases have adopted such a view arid defined a firm's labor
market by reference to actual commuting patterns of its workforce or
applicant pool and/or by reasonable expected commuting patterns.2 For
example, with respect to the former criterion, the numbers of qualified (to
be defined below) protected and nonprotected class individuals in each area
is sometimes weighted by the fraction of a firm's employees (or applicants)
who reside in the area to compute an overall availability rate.3 With
respect to the latter, the weights assigned to each residential area are
sometimes assumed to decline monotonically with the distance between the area
and the firm.4
7To date, the courts appear to have overlooked the fact that willingness
to commute differs by race and sex. There is much evidence that females
tend to live closer to their jobs than males and some evidence that non-
whites commute shorter distances than whites.5 To the extent that these dif-
ferences reflect voluntary labor supply decisions, this suggests that in
computing availability ratios the weights assigned to each residential area
might be reasonably expected to differ by gender or race. For example, a
function relating the fraction of male applicants from a given residential
area to the distance of that area from a firm might start (at 0 distance)
lower but extend farther out than the comparable female function.
Other things equal, as we move to more highly skilledand compensated workers,
commuting costs become relatively less important and the size of the local
labor market expands; a tendency the courts have recognized.6 However, the
courts have been less consistent with economic theory in their treatment of
availability in national labor markets, markets for highly skilled profes-
sionals where the job search by both employers and potential employees is
truly national in scope. To say that a market is national is not to say
that a given firm's chances of attracting employees from all areas of the
country are equal. For example, professionals raised and trained in the
"sunbelt" may have strong nonpecuniary preferences for remaining there
rather than moving to a snowbelt state. Moreover, we know that interstate
migration rates decline with distance, even for highly skilled professionals.
Finally, firms located In Isolated small towns may face problems in attracting
professionals with career—oriented spouses because the chances of the spouse's
finding an acceptable job offer In such a town may be ouite low. Court
cases that use national availability data for professional employees appear
to ignore these considerations.7
8B. The Pool of Potential Applicants
While the earliest court decisions permitted the use of population
representation as an appropriate standard for availability,8 it was soon
realized that population figures included individuals who were not available
for work (e.g., the aged, young children, individuals in institutions).
Later cases moved to the use of civilian labor force data9 and, in cases
where occupational qualifications could be established, to the use of the
qualified civilian labor forceJ0
Although this is clearly movement in the right direction, a number of
thorny conceptual issues remain; these all relate to the fact that the
stock of qualified individuals in an area is not equal to the flow of
potential applicants to a firm. First, the civilian labor force consists
both of employed and unemployed workers and, as noted above, the response
of each group to job offers is likely to be different. Some work by
economists has considered the possibility of using a "reservation wage
approach" to compute the number of potential applicants, but it is unclear
how the courts will react to this methodology.11 It is clear, however, that
employed and unemployed workers should not be given equal weight in comput-
ing availability numbers; since unemployment rates differ by race and sex,
to do so would bias availability comparisons.
Next, In computing applicant pools, the focus in court cases is often
on the total stock of "qualified" individuals In the labor market. As Is
well—documented, however, the probability of voluntary turnover declines
with age. The focus should more appropriately be on relatively young
employed workers in a labor market, with older more experienced workers
receiving less weight in the computation of availability. Put another way,
the flow of new hires should be contrasted to the flow of potential appli-
cants, not to the stock of existing employees in the labor market. If the
9protected class proportion of new entrants exceeds their proportion of
all employees (due to increased minority population and female labor force
participation rates), the former proportion will lead to higher standards
being set for protected class hiring. While it is now routine for uni-
versities hiring at the assistant professor level to focus on the share of
protected class members in the new Ph.D. pool, it is our impression that
in most other cases, older individuals are assumed to be equally "avaitable"
to a firm as younger oners.
Finally, a firm's compensation policy may affect the fraction of
minorities or females in its potential applicant pooi for at least two
reasons. On the one hand, if reservation wage functions differ for
minorities or females in the applicant pool will vary systematically with
a firm's wage policy.12 On the other hand, holding total compensation
fixed, firms that offer high wages but lower fringe benefits may generate——
for reasons noted above——more female and minority applicants than those
that offer low—wage/high—fringe packages. To date, the courts do not seem
to have realized that a nondiscriminating firm's compensation policy may
affect the race/sex composition of its potential applicant pool.
C. Which Potential Applicants Are Qualified?
In a number of cases dealing with skilled and semi—skilled workers, the
courts have ruled that occupational representation is an appropriate availa-
bility standard.13 In some cases, for example those dealing with teachers,
determining who is qualified to be hired is straightforward (employed teachers
and other individuals who meet state or local teacher certification require-
ments). In other cases, however, qualifications are much more nebulous.
While some jobs require very specific skills and prior occupational exper-
ience, others may require only general age/education/labor market experience
10
credentials. It is clear that no general guidelines will emerge here.
What about the question of training? While a 1977 General Services
Administration document defined availability to include those ". . .who are
capable of acquiring those skills within a reasonable period of time,"14
we find no evidence that the courts have adopted this position. We believe
this to be wise, for one knows from human capital theory that the costs of
all general training, and some share of the costs of specific training,
must be "borne" by workers if firms are permitted to maximize profits.
Hence, If already trained workers were available, firms would hire untrained
workers only If the latter were willing to accept lower wages and/or forgo
training opportunities. If the protected class workers were disproportionately
concentrated among the untrained (rather than the trained), and the courts
counted such workers among the available set, then one of three outcomes
woulc necessarily occur even In nondiscriminating firms: (1) New hires from
the protected class would receive lower rates, on average, than other new
hires; (2) the protected class new hires would be more likely than these
others to be shunted into dead—end jobs that provide no training opportunities;
or (3) firms would be constrained from maximizing profits. Since the first
two outcomes might erroneously lead to allegations of discrimination and the
third might reduce the number of nondiscriminating employers, none of the
three outcomes seems socially desirable.
Finally, given a qualified applicant pool, the courts have agreed that
employers have the right to choose the subset of applicants that they con-
sider to be the most qualified)5 However, It is not sufficient to argue
that explicit or Implicit hiring standards (e.g., test scores or education
levels) are believed to be correlated with subsequent productivity. Rather
it must be documented that they are valid predictors for the particular
11
employer. Put another way, although a variety of economic theories
(human capital, screening, neo—Marxian) all suggest that increased education
is associated with increased productivity, in the absence of explicit
evidence that such an association exists at a particular firm, the courts
appear to be unwilling to accept evidence on differences in mean education
levels between protected group and other applicants as a justification for
differential hire rates between the two groups.16
IV. Policy Issues
Hiring employees can be conceived of as a two—step procedure. Appli-
cants are first generated, and then employees are selected from among the
applicants. We examine each step below (in reverse order) within the con-
text of legal policy issues.
A. Selection Criteria
The Supreme Court17 has enunciated the general rule that a plaintiff
has made a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a selection
device has a significant disparate impact on race or sex (i.e., the ratio of
those passing to those taking the test differs significantly by race or sex).
Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been established by the
plaintiff, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the business
practice giving rise to the disparate impact grows out of a business neces-
sity. The Supreme Court has also emphasized the validity of inferring dis-
crimination if the overall selection ratios of the firm (those hired divided
by those applying) are significantly different by race or sex.18 The import-
ance of showing disparate outcomes has been a key factor in stimulating
the use of statistical methods and economic theory in discrimination cases
involving the hiring process.
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A statistical issue raised by the disparate impact standard is how
to measure the "significance" of any differences in hiring ratios. The
courts have considered criteria of statistical significance in some areas,
focusing on hire rates being different at the .05 level of significance or
being at least two to three standard deviations apart.19 In other cases,
they have considered (but not always accepted) a standard of whether pro-
tected class applicant hire rates are at least eighty percent of the hire
rate of other applicants. 20
There are well—known deficiencies with both of these approaches. The
focus on statistical significance makes it difficult to prove evidence of
disparate impacts in situations where there are a small number of observa-
tions, either because an employer has done proportionately little hiring
or its workforce is small in size. The "eighty percent" rule is arbitrary
and is not grounded in any analytic framework. Nonetheless, it seems clear
that the criteria ultimately chosen should involve issues of both statistical
and quantitative significance. One senses, for example, that hire rates
for a large employer of .49 for minorities and .50 for nonminorities which
are statistically significantly different should not be taken as strong
evidence of disparate impact.
Given that statistical significance is difficult to infer when samples
are small, that arbitrary standards can be disputed, and that a finding of
"disparate impact" leads to a finding of discrimination only in cases where
selection standards cannot be shown to be job—related, it seems that courts
will inevitably be drawn into the issue of judging firms' hiring criteria.
It would thus appear difficult for courts to sidestep the evaluation of
hiring procedures by looking just at hiring outcomes.
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B. Actual vs. Potential Applicant Pools
A firm that appears to apply nondiscriminatory hiring criteria to its
applicants may in fact employ methods of recruiting applicants that are
discriminatory in intent or effect. For this reason, the courts have
sometimes been reluctant to accept a firm's actual applicant flow as the
basis for judging the fairness of selection procedures; estimates of the
potential applicant flow it faces thus enters the picture.
If data on the actual applicant flow to a firm are available, the
courts appear to have concluded that it is preferable to use such data
rather than estimates of potential applicant flows, provided that the repre-
sentation of protected group members in the former is equal to or exceeds
their representation in the latter.2' However, if actual applicant flow
data are distorted by application procedures, recruitment practices, or
other actions that discourage protected group members from applying,
potential applicant flow data may be preferred.22 This seems to almost
reduce to the rule "use the type of applicant flow data that yields the
highest representation of protected group members." There are two major
flaws with this rule.
First, were "potential availability" accurately estimatable, a standard
of actual or potential availability, which ever is higher, would create a
goal that cannot be attained in the aggregate. The reason is simple: to
the extent that actual availability exceeded expected availability in any
firm, the aggregate goal would exceed the number potentially available.
More importantly, however, it seems clear from our review of both
theory and evidence that factors affecting the availability of potential
applicants to a particular firm can be highly specific. Thus, while esti-
mates of expected availability can be obtained from a careful count and
14
weighting of various workers in the labor market, a specific firm will
usually be able to point to aspects of its training or recruiting policies,
compensation packages, or skill needs that make it atypical. It appears to
us that comparing actual to potential applicant flows for lurloses of
finding "disparate impact" will often involve quite legitimate disputes.
A logical extension of the judicial standard applying to hiring criteria
would seem to involve the following: If a firm's actual applicant flows
from protected classes are below those expected, the firm is permitted an
attempt to demonstrate that the totality of its recruitment procedures
(including its location and its compensation package) serve the purpose of
business necessity. Once again, it appears to us impossible for the courts
to circumvent the need to judge a firm's policies or procedures by looking
only at outcomes.
Unfortunately, court judgments on whether a firm's policies are non-
discriminatory presents an issue of profound importance. Suppose two plants
are located side—by—side in a suburban location, but one pays a high wage
that attracts black applicants from the central city and the other does not.
Should a court be permitted to order the lower—wage firm to raise its wage?
Should a high—wage firm that attracts white suburban applicants despite
being located in the central city be told to reduce its wage to increase
the proportion of black applicants? Should courts make similar judgments
about a firm's fringe benefit package or its reasons for relocating a plant?
Courts are now allowed to make judgments about the business necessity of a
firm's hiring criteria, so perhaps a logical extension of this power is
judicial intrusion into matters of compensation levels, fringe benefit
packages and location policy. It is a step, however, fraught with serious
implications for a market system.
15
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